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Abstract 
    Sovereign risk became a common issue after 2007 financial crisis happened. However, the 
crisis was only an incentive. Some high sovereign risk countries had lacked reliable sovereign risk 
management framework and lend overmuch debt before the crisis came. High cost of crisis and 
succeeding recession gave the world a critical strike. Using the cases of Sweden and China, I 
argue that fiscal expenditure constraints, debt control, and surplus accumulation in common time 
are most important measures to manage sovereign risk. A stable and efficient sovereign risk 
management regime framework is beneficial. A medium-term fiscal stability target should be 
included. Early intention, temporary stimulus policy and other budget measures could decrease 
cost of crisis and recession. A development domestic debt market could help relief refinancing 
pressure of government when some external shock happened. Perfect framework of statistics, 
specific accounting standard, high transparency will help the government, creditors, and investors 
reach some debt restructure agreement. 
Ⅰ.Introduction 
The financial crisis which began at the second half of 2007 shocked the world economy 
strongly. Although many measures have been taken, the crisis’s impacts continue. And at the same 
time, sovereign risks emerge (IMF, 2010a).  
In this paper, Sovereign risk is defined in default probability of a sovereign’s public debt. It is 
more indicative for foreign investors who loan debt priced in foreign currency to the sovereign. 
Higher Sovereign risk makes a country have to pay higher risk premium. In some extreme cases, 
the debt cost is so high that a country’ government is unable to bear up, it have to choose default 
and go to bankruptcy or pursuit international rescue, such as Iceland and Greece nowdays. During 
a recession, sovereign risk usually exposes to two directly reasons. First, a sovereign had 
accumulated so much public debt before the recession’s coming, and it can’t borrow money at 
former interest rate in the distress market. Second, operation of automatic stabilizers and some 
stimulating measures add fiscal deficit and intensify the government’s repayment ability (IMF, 
2009). Above all, fundamental reasons are: lacking government expenditure constraints, 
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inefficiency of public debt management, inaccuracy of revenue and expenditure forecast, great 
volatility of debt market, and so on. 
To reduce the high sovereign risk and avoid bankruptcy, a central government has to find 
some new refinancing resources. One critical method is inflation tax. High inflation can erode the 
real value of debt contract that are set in nominal terms, or at least imperfectly indexed to the price 
level (Michael and Roberto, 1997). In 1980s of Latin America, inflation tax was usually used by 
governments to deal with fiscal crisis. Its obvious shortage is that public distrust will make 
government’s financing more difficult in future. And it can’t influence the value of debt 
denominated in foreign currency. The second method is to borrow money from domestic debt 
market. The result is decided by the development and condition of the market at that time. The 
third one is to sell state-owned assets to collect money. The challenges are from political and 
social sides. The forth one is to pursuit rescue from abroad. While, this one is hard to be defined as 
a method. The sovereign would have to follow terms raised by rescuers. These terms often 
includes deficit cut and tightening policies during recession period, a specified repayment plan as 
well (Morris, 2001). It means a country’s policy decisions will be influenced severely by abroad 
power. This solution is not favorable to most countries. 
This paper focused on sovereign risk management from a recession angle. I use the cases of 
Sweden and China, and argue that good sovereign risk management should be started at the good 
time. A regime framework of fiscal constraints is necessary, which should think about additional 
fiscal pressure during recession period. In SectionⅡ, I talk about the impacts of this crisis on 
fiscal stability of the world. The crisis observably aggravated sovereign risks. Section Ⅲ 
introduce strategy and  methods to manage sovereign risks.  Section Ⅳ  and Ⅴ  analysis 
Sweden and China’s sovereign risk management. At end of this paper, I give some remark. 
Ⅱ.The Impact of financial crisis on sovereign risks 
Sovereign risk could rise in many situations. Unexpected changes in macroeconomic 
variables often have major consequences for fiscal sustainability, especially in the case of 
exchange rate depreciations in countries with large foreign currency (IMF, 2008a). IMF use the 
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data of 27 advanced economies for 1995–2007 and 131 emerging/developing countries for 
2002–2007, to estimate main variables implying substantial sovereign risks. They find that a 
one-half standard deviation permanent shock to real growth would increase the debt/GDP ratio 
five years later by 6.8 percent of GDP on average in a sample of 19 advanced and emerging 
market countries. A one-half standard deviation shock to the primary deficit would raise the 
debt/GDP ratio by 5.2 percentage points. In developing countries (based on a limited sample), a 
decline in economic growth would have an especially notable effect on debt (8.5%). It means a 
developing country’s fiscal solvency more depend on its economic growth.  
When a systemic banking crisis happens in a country, it will have to bear more serious fiscal 
pressure from government intervention and stimulus. During the crisis period, a country usually 
has to rescue the financial sector through capital injection, bank restructure, liquidity provision, 
and other measures. It also needs to provide guarantees to depositors and debtors. Unlimited 
deposit guarantees, open-ended liquidity support, repeated recapitalizations, debtor bail-outs and 
regulatory forbearance add significantly and sizably to costs (Honohan and Klingebiel, 2000). 
Laeven and Valencia (2008) find that fiscal costs, net of recoveries, associated with crisis 
management can be substantial, about 13.3 percent of GDP on average, and can be as high as 55.1 
percent of GDP in 40 banking crises. Recovery of fiscal expense is about 2.7 percent of GDP on 
average, and the highest one is 26.1 percent of GDP.  
The present crisis and recession are also very costly. According to IMF (2009), many of G20 
countries have provided, or announced the intent to provide, significant support to their financial 
sectors. The support includes capital injection, purchases of asset and lending by treasury, liquidity 
provision, and guarantees. The average support scale of G20 is 32.5 percent of GDP. This figure of 
advanced economies is 50.4 percent; the one of emerging economies is 2.4 percent. It means the 
crisis threats advanced countries more than emerging countries. Of course, the terminal cost of 
these supports cannot be so high. Only confirmed lost of purchased asset, loans and guarantees 
should be account in fiscal lost. IMF (2009) estimated that the terminal cost of G20 for supporting 
financial sectors is 3.8 percent of GDP on average, including 5.8 percent for advanced economies 
and 0.2 for emerging economies (Table 1).  
5 
Table 1: Estimated G20’ Net Cost from Financial Sector Support Measures 
 
Source: IMF (2009) 
The other part of fiscal cost is from succeeding recession. Automatic Stabilizers, lost of 
funded pensions and stimulate measures will increase fiscal expense or decrease revenue, and 
intensify deficit. 2009 is a year of recession worldwide. At the end of this year, World fiscal deficit 
is 6.7 percent of GDP on average, highest since 2000; advanced economies’ is 8.7, highest since 
1980; emerging economies’ is 4.4, highest since 2000. Public debt scale also makes a new record. 
Advanced economies’ public debt is more than 90 percent of GDP on average, highest since 1980; 
Emerging economies’ is 66 percent of GDP (Figure 1).  
Figure 1: Fiscal condition of the world 
  
    Source: IMF (2010b) 
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Obviously, a crisis and succeeding recession will increase fiscal expenditure and sovereign 
risks largely. In this crisis which started in advanced economies, those countries paid more than 
emerging and developing countries. And they had higher level of deficit and public debt. Does it 
mean that advanced countries have higher sovereign risks? Reinhart et al (2003) found something 
different that emerging countries have low “debt intolerance”. Some countries’ "safe" external 
debt/GNP thresholds are as low as 15 percent in some cases. These thresholds depend on a 
country's default and inflation history. So it’s difficult to set some common absolute and 
quantitative “safe” standard of debt level for all countries. But facing the frequent and unexpected 
crisis and recession, a country should put more efforts on sovereign risk management. It’s 
important not only for the government, but also for domestic firms and households. 
Ⅲ.How to manage sovereign risk in crisis and recession time 
Target: Keeping fiscal sustainability in medium-term. 
During bad times, public finance often has to suffer greater pressure than normal times. The 
government receives more political stress to keep original standard of social wealth and make 
stimulus measures during this period. Total of these expenses is so high that it exceeds the limits 
of fiscal balance and public debt space. Sovereign risk may rise to the “trigger point” quickly 
(Like Greece event). To avoid it, we should take a fresh look at the relation between crisis 
management and sovereign risk management. Both of them have same important status in fiscal 
policies. Policy makers should think more about fiscal sustainability in different terms levels, 
unless they would like to see a succeeding sovereign crisis after a financial crisis. 
Fiscal sustainability means a country’s public debt should not be more than the present 
discounted value of its expected future primary surpluses (James and Marjorie, 1986; Blanchard et 
al, 1990). Real interest rate and growth rate are key factors dominating the appropriate public debt 
level. Macroeconomic situations are so different among countries that it’s hard to make a single 
quantitative threshold for all. IMF (2003) concluded that the average level of public debt of 
emerging countries should not be more than 25 percent of GDP. It’s not clear if all emerging 
countries would accept this idea. But these countries often have more economic and financial 
fluctuations than development economies. A short-term and medium-term fiscal balance target 
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including these fluctuations is necessary (Audrey and Sumudu, 2007), if it’s hard to forecast 
accurately impact factors for fiscal situation in long-term. A prudent policy maker should leave 
enough deficit and debt space for predictable and unpredictable volatilities.  
Strategy: Managing crisis and recession directed by a medium-term fiscal sustainability regime 
framework 
In financial crisis and recession times, fiscal expenditure will increase much more than 
ordinary time, especially faster. Deficit may rise by a big margin in short term. If a country has not 
a good fiscal condition or confirmed external financing sources, its sovereign risk will rise rapidly 
to an intolerable level. So policy makers should think about medium-term fiscal sustainability 
when they make countermeasures. For this kind country, it’s usually very difficult keeping 
short-term stability in recession time. But if its fiscal system keeps running well directed by a 
medium-term fiscal sustainability regime framework, it will keep opposite strong repayment 
ability in future years. Some short-term increases of deficit and public debt could be understood 
and accepted by its creditors and public debt investors. This helps real interest rates keep stable or 
rise not too high. It means the country could continue to get external financing by acceptable cost. 
Its influence on debt cost of firm sector and financial sector should be controlled. Thus the 
economy could operate better and goes out of recession earlier. 
It’s an easy idea but a hard road for many countries. First, it’s very difficult to forecast fiscal 
cost of crisis and management. During crisis period, key economic variables often change quickly. 
Fiscal countermeasures have to be adjusted at the same time. So projections of revenue and fiscal 
expenditure can’t be precise. Sometime, the margin will be very large. Deficit and new financing 
need may quickly exceed the limits of medium-term sustainability framework. If the shock mainly 
comes from external, the situation will be more complicated. Second, fiscal policies are often 
procyclical in emerging economies (Reinhart et al, 2004; Ilzetzki and Vegh, 2008). Government 
often choose to increase spending in bloom time and decrease in recession time. When bad time 
comes, they would have only limited budget to deal with crisis and recession. But under great 
external pressure, they have to make some countermeasures which maybe actually hurt fiscal 
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sustainability2 . Third, it’s difficult to keep the balance between discretionary policies and 
medium-term fiscal sustainability in recession times. For some countries, fiscal authority is in 
charge of making fiscal countermeasures, and draw up medium-term fiscal sustainability 
framework. Emergency measures may look more important at the special time. Sustainability 
problem is put in secondary position. 
Methods 
Suitable methods could help implement strategy and achieve target. On sovereign risk 
management, every country has different initial conditions and deep concerns. There is no method 
could be applied by all countries. But we can survey some sound practices to give useful 
reference.  
·Establishing and consolidating medium-term fiscal sustainability framework. 
To solve interest conflict of fiscal authority, it’s better to choose some independent institution 
to establish and charge a medium-term fiscal sustainability framework. The parliament may act 
this role. In most of countries, Parliament holds the power to examine fiscal policies and approve 
large amounts of expenditure and public investment. It has enough incentive to keep fiscal 
sustainability in medium-term and long-term. 
·Adjusting Strategy of crisis management. 
Different strategy and method of crisis management generate different fiscal cost. And some 
expensive measures appear no better than others (Honohan and Klingebiel, 2000). When public 
debt reaches extreme level, some stimulus even have negative effect (Alan, 1997).To keep fiscal 
stability and solvency, “cheap” strategies and measures should be thought. Some temporary 
expansionary fiscal policies are better than permanent ones (IMF, 2008b), such as temporary tax 
cut or expense increasing. Some early interventions can weaken succeeding shocks, although they 
often raise moral hazard problem (i.e. bank’s asset restructuring).  
·Moderating domestic impulse on expansionary policies. 
                                                             
2
 In many developing and transition countries, political instability will press the government to make some 
myopic policies which induce higher debt levels (Frank, 2002). 
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Not every stimulus can result in satisfied effect on economic recovery. But in recession time, 
the public often hope government to make stimulus as much as possible to help the economy 
recover as early as possible, no matter the effects and costs of these measures. So public sentiment 
should be lead to rational channel. That is more like a political issue. 
·Improving fiscal transparency. 
In recession time, making an agreement among different social classes including investor 
groups on fiscal policies is very important. Good fiscal transparency and communication will help 
them know more about the country’s fiscal condition and reach the agreement. A stable fiscal 
transparency regime framework is necessary. Public should get enough national and local fiscal 
information to understand policies and make their own conclusion. Transparency will facilitate 
social reconciliation and stability in difficult time. 
·Consolidating good investor relationships. 
External financing is unavoidable for a country during recession. But financial markets are 
usually frail at that time. The country has to pay more cost than ordinary time for same debt. 
Sometimes, it needs to talk about renewal of debt contracts with creditors or main institutional 
investors. Good investor relationships will lighten this pressure. Like shareholders of firms, 
creditors of government debt also should be treated well. They need to know safety situation of 
their investment. They hope the country give them some promise on repayment or schedule of 
solvency ability rebuilding. All of these matters must be discussed in mutual trustful and friendly 
atmosphere. Rehabbing and consolidating investor relationships are very important. 
 Sovereign risk management should be done not only in high risk period, but also in peaceful 
period. Most of methods need long time accumulation of basic work, such as preparation of crisis 
management scenario, good investor relationship, trust and support from the public, and so on. 
Sovereign risk management should become a central government’s daily responsibility. 
Ⅳ.Sweden 
After the banking crisis which began in 1991, Sweden built a creditable fiscal policy 
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framework step by step to keep fiscal sustainability. The fiscal policy framework aims at both 
long-term sustainability and the avoidance of a fiscal policy which results in short-term 
destabilizing effects (ministry of finance, 2009). The framework helps Sweden control the trend of 
public debt increasing and keep fiscal balance. When the financial crisis of 2007 happened, 
Sweden had a better fiscal condition to deal with the crisis. And the framework worked well on 
sovereign risk management during the bad time. 
Regime framework 
The banking crisis of 1990s influenced Sweden fiscal stability deeply. Public debt reached 
71.9 percent of GDP on average during 1993-1996. And the trend appeared no signal of reversal. 
In 1995, Sweden became a member of European Union. According to Maastricht Criteria, a 
member state of EU should match at least 2 requirements on public finance. First, the annual 
government deficit should not exceed 3 percent of GDP. Second, the gross government debt must 
not exceed 60 percent of GDP. These two figures of Sweden are 2.0% and 72.2% respectively. The 
country had to do something to change the situation.  
An expenditure ceiling with a three-year period was introduced in the central government’s 
budget bill by the parliament since 1997. All expenditure financed by central government revenue 
should be included under the ceiling, excluding Interest of public debt and expenditure in the 
old-age pension system. The ceiling is decided by the parliament three years in advance. Before 
that, a proposal of the government will be thought over. Following the set ceiling, the government 
has to cut its extra expenditure to avoid exceeding the ceiling. At the same time, the government 
was required to improve transparency of fiscal policies. 
In 2000, a surplus target was implemented by general government sector. It is that the general 
government sector’s accumulative surplus should reach to 1 per cent of GDP over a business cycle. 
A business cycle usually is a period of 7 years. This is a medium-term target. It limits general 
government sector to cause regular deficits by making expansive policies. In the same year, local 
governments began to be required keeping annual fiscal balance. If a local government made a 
deficit, it needs to fill the gap in next three years. 
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New sustainability framework draws clear policy border and process for central government 
and its fiscal authority. Policy makers have to think about fiscal sustainability targets when they do 
expenditure decisions. Ratio of Sweden public debt to GDP began to fell down after 1997. Annual 
surplus was achieved after 1996 (Figure 5). Before crisis 2007, Sweden public debt equaled about 
40 percent of GDP, largely under the Maastricht limition. It’s difficult to conclude the fiscal 
sustainability framework caused this result. 1996-2007 is Sweden’s blooming period. “Growth 
dividend” (Bohn, 2005)may help to improve its fiscal conditions. Figure 6 indicates that quantity 
of central government debt increased year by year in this period. But higher economic growth 
made a lower ratio of debt to GDP. From a policy angle, a sustainability framework could 
constraint the government’s pro-cyclical activities, and support to save for recession time. 
Fiscal implication of the global financial crisis 
As a little development open economy largely depending on export, Sweden was shocked 
seriously by this global financial crisis. Its growth fell down since 2008 like other European 
countries. In 2009, its annual GDP contracted by 4.9 percent than last year. This is a worst record 
since 1980. It’s even lower than Sweden’s banking crisis period in 1990s (Figure 2). Export sector 
failed to push the economy up as past years. It performed unsatisfactory and decreased 12.1 
percent (Figure 3). Unemployment rate rose almost 2 percent to 8.3 percent. This is the worst 
record since 1998. The employment conditions will not change better before 2011, European 
Commission estimated in April, 2010 (Figure 4).  
Figure 2: Sweden Annual growth of GDP 
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    Source: WEO database, Statistics Sweden. Numbers after 2009 are estimated by IMF staff. 
Figure 3: Exports and imports of goods and services in Sweden 
                                          In percent of GDP 
 
          Source: World Development Indicators database; Statistics Sweden.  
Figure 4: Unemployment rate of Sweden 
 
Source: European Commission, Statistical Annex of European Economy, spring 2010. 
Figures for 2010 and 2011 are estimated by commission staff. 
The crisis fluctuated Sweden’s financial stability. Sweden’s major banks didn’t hold much 
securitized asset. Most of their losses came from loans, especially loans to Baltic countries. 
Riksbank (central bank of Sweden) estimated these banks’ loan losses would be SEK 155 billion 
(about 19.8 billion U.S. dollars.) during 2009-2011, equal to 2.3 percent of total loans. If recession 
continues longer, the banks’ losses would increase.  
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Table 2: Loan losses of Sweden’s major banks. 
 
Source: Riksbank, 2009, “financial Stability Report 2009 2”. 
    To consolidate financial and economic stability, the government made some measures since 
2008. It raised deposit guarantee from SEK 250000 ($ 32000) to SEK500000 ($64000). a 
voluntary guarantee program valued SEK1500 billion ($192.2 billion) and a voluntary capital 
injection program valued SEK 50 billion ($ 6.4 billion) were introduced. Of course, financial 
institutions which want to join these two programs should pay charges. A special stability fund 
valued 15 billion ($1.9 billion) was set up to support these programs. At the same time, Riksbanks 
and the National Debt Office also made some measures to stabilize the financial markets. 
    The government made some measures to cope with the recession. A SEK 32 billion ($4.1 
billion) stimulus plan was introduced in 2008, which included tax cut and investments 
infrastructure, health care, research and education. Other measures to support local government 
and unemployment groups were followed. The government estimated that the total cost of its 
countermeasures will reach SEK 83 billion ($ 10.6 billion) at the end of 2010, equal to 2.7 percent 
of GDP. The number doesn’t include local governments’ part. 
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Table 3: Support measures aimed at the financial sector 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2009, Update of Sweden's convergence programme 2009. 
Recession increased Sweden’s fiscal pressure. Because of financial sector rescue, 
autostabilizer and stimulus, net lending of general government largely fell to 0.4 percent in 2009, 
compared with last year’s 4.1 percent. Public debt aggregated sharply from 38.3 percent of GDP 
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in 2008 to 42.3 in 2009. It’s a biggest jump since 1993 (Figure 5 and figure 6). The government 
estimated that the fiscal situation won’t change better until the economy begins to recover. And as 
an export depending country, Sweden’s recovery may come later than the rest of the world. Fiscal 
sustainability faces greater and longer challenge than other European development countries. 
Figure 5: General government net lending and consolidated gross debt of Sweden 
 
        Source: European Commission, Statistical Annex of European Economy, spring 2010.  
Net lending excludes interest of debt. Figures for 2010 and 2011 are estimated 
by commission staff. 
Sovereign risk management 
    The special character of Sweden’s sovereign risk management is the fiscal framework. This 
framework helps to keep short-term and medium-term fiscal sustainability. So the sovereign risk 
management had begun before the recession came. Mainly supported by early growth years, 
Sweden keeps excellent trend of fiscal development before recession. Annual surplus was 
achieved since 1996. Although the debt quantity increased, the ratio of public debt to GDP 
declined quickly (Figure 6 and 7). Partly because of that, Sweden posed a strong figure to face 
the recession when it came. The fiscal framework ran well in recession time. Past surplus years 
permitted the government make expansionary polices. One or two year deficit were tolerated too. 
The rule of expenditure ceiling was treated well. The public debt kept an appropriate level 
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among European countries (Figure 7). It is too early to say that Sweden can pass through the 
recession smoothly. But the country really did good preparation and got dominant position. 
Figure 6: Sweden central government debt 
 
        Source: Statistics Sweden. 
Figure 7: public debt of 27 members of EU 
 
Source: European Commission, Statistical Annex of European Economy, spring 2010. 
Figures for 2010 and 2011 are estimated by commission staff 
Taking measures at early stage of the recession also decreased possible fiscal cost in future. 
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and potential risks in financial sector. Creditability of main banks was strengthened. Most of 
banks increased their core capital enough. Investors’ confidence was also stable. So the terminal 
fiscal cost on financial sector rescue will be controlled.  
It seemed that good communication and cooperation between the parliament and the 
government went on during the difficult period. The budget bill of next year will be presented in 
detail to the parliament at the end of last year, and disclosed to the public at the same time. The 
division of expenditure ceilings of 2009-2011 has thought about uncertainty of economic growth 
and expenditure trend. The government believes the ceilings are adequate. The achievement of 
surplus target will be a little difficult for next few years deficit. But it could not influence 
medium-term fiscal stability. The fiscal framework is more like some political commitment 
rather a law, and there are no predetermined sanctions for exceeding the ceiling, as commented 
by Ljungman (2008). The government could arrange fiscal expenditure with more flexibility to 
deal with the recession. But exceeding the framework means more political cost. 
Some problem exists in Sweden’s financing sources. Because of its choice of keeping 
Krona, and absent of a development domestic debt market, it has to issue public debt in foreign 
currency. At the end of April 2010, 62.4 percent of its public debt is priced in foreign currency, 
including euro (27.3%), U.S dollars (32.7%), and other currency (Figure 8). The high share of 
foreign currency debt made Sweden’s cost of public debt was easier to be influenced by 
exchange rate volatility. Its float exchange rate regime can’t help it control the risks. Sweden 
Krona is more fluctuant in crisis time like other small currency (figure 9). For addressing this 
problem, Sweden used some hedge instruments, like swaps, index-link bonds. These instruments 
decrease uncertainty of existing debt cost. But they can’t cover all market risks during recession 
time. And it may be more difficult to issue new debt in international markets in such times. 
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Figure 8: Currency structure of Sweden’s public debt (April, 2010) 
 
.    Source: Sweden National Debt Office. 
Figure 9: Exchange rates of Sweden Krona 
 
Source: Sweden National Debt Office, “Guidelines for central government debt management 
2010”. 
Ⅴ.China 
    China’s fiscal stability experienced shocks from earth quakes and global financial crisis in 
these two years. The events influenced its fiscal operation largely in current year and next years. 
High economic growth help china pass through difficult times. But its incomplete fiscal 
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framework has appeared some inadaptation to deal with today’s sovereign risk management issue. 
Future continuous growth and stable domestic financing source could consolidate its fiscal 
sustainability.  And some reform measures are on road. 
    Fiscal framework 
National People’s Congress (NPC, parliament of China) approved Budget Act in 1994. This 
is first fiscal budget law of China since its announcement of transformation to socialism market 
economy in 1992. The Act requires central government and local governments should build their 
own annual fiscal budgets. The principle is “To keep the balance of revenue and expenditure”. It 
emphasizes reasonable scale and structure of public debt, but doesn’t give clearly quantitative 
limits of deficit and debt on short-term or medium-term level like Sweden. And it doesn’t 
emphasize countercyclical fiscal policies. It clearly forbids local government to finance from 
external sources.  
The central government reports its implement of last annual budget and new budget draft to 
NPC in every March. Congresses will deliberate and decide to approve the report or not, and 
approve the scale of new issuing public debt. The process indicates that China’s sovereign risk 
management is mainly directed by a short-term idea. A local government also needs to report to its 
corresponding people congress. From 2009, Central government increased the content of its report, 
disclosed more details, and improved understandability. 
As a big developing economy, China manages to keep the balance of growth and area 
equalization. That means central government should control enough payment capacity. After a tax 
regime reform, a tax-distribution framework was found in 1994. According to the framework, 
central government and local governments would share all tax revenues and arrange respective 
expenditure. A part of central government’s increasing revenues was used to support local 
governments by tax rebate and transfer payment. Actually, this reform strengthened central 
government expenditure capacity. It got more space to make expansionary fiscal policies to 
facilitate economic growth and adjust development unbalance among different areas through 
transfer payment. Tax rebates and transfer payments shared 65.2 percent of central government 
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total expenditure in 2009.  
    Reform of 1994 didn’t cover all fiscal revenues. Some non-tax revenues are excluded, such 
as profits of state-owned enterprises, one-time charge for state-owned land user, some government 
funds and special charges with a tax nature. These revenues exist out of the fiscal budget. Because 
of these revenues, local governments got complement and flexibility which they can’t get in 
formal framework. Before 2007 global financial crisis, the scale of revenue out of budget had 
touched 90 billion dollars, about 13.2% of that in budget (Table 4). The net lending out of budget 
kept being positive since 1986. Even the published numbers out of budget can’t present operation 
of this informal fiscal system. The amount of charges for land user was not included until 2009. In 
China, these charges are part of municipality and county governments’ non-tax revenue. The total 
amount of these charges is 208.8 billion dollars
3
, about 4.2 percent of GDP. Contingent liabilities 
are excluded too. China central government has many potential guarantees on liabilities of 
financial sector, local governments, state-owned enterprises and government background 
institutions. These contingent liabilities should be evaluated and calculated in fiscal budget. 
China government is trying to build a consolidated budget including revenues and 
expenditures in budget and out of budget. It has begun to made independent state-owned property 
budget, government fund budget, and pension budget as preparation for a consolidated budget 
since 2009. But a budget reform may shake the original tax-distribution framework, and influence 
tax shares of central government and local governments. So central government appeared very 
prudent on this issue.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
3
 Source: China Ministry of Finance. 
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Table 4: Fiscal conditions of China in 2007 
 
Source: China National Bureau of Statistics. 
Fiscal implication of the global financial crisis 
China also suffered a lot from this crisis like Sweden. Export sector was shocked strongly by 
external recession. In 2008, it declined by 9.6 percent after 11 years growth. In 2009, level of 
declining reached 16%, import fell down largely as well (Figure 10, 11). The first monthly trade 
deficit of last 6 years appeared in March, 2010. Because of the situation of global recession and 
recovery, China export conditions may change better slowly, but it’s hard to return high growth as 
before. Because Export sector holds important position in China economic growth, its slump 
lagged GDP growth. After 2007, China economic growth slowed down and unemployment rate 
rised (Figure 12).But not like Sweden, domestic demand could still expand growth space for this 
large developing economy. 
 
 
 
Central
Governemnt
Local
Governments
total
Central
Governemnt
Local
Governments
total
In budget
       Revenue 380.1 322.9 703.0 10.8 9.2 19.9
       Expenditure 405.2 276.7 681.9 11.5 7.9 19.3
       Net lending -25.1 46.2 21.1 -0.7 1.3 0.6
Out of budget
       Revenue 7.3 86.2 93.4 0.2 2.4 2.7
       Expenditure 6.2 77.5 83.7 0.2 2.2 2.4
       Net Lending 1.1 8.6 9.7 0.0 0.2 0.3
Amount (billion dollars) Percentage of GDP
Items
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Figure 10: Export and Import Annual growth of China(%) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators database, data of 2009 from China National 
Bureau of Statistics 
 
Figure 11:  Ratios of Export and Import to GDP of China 
 
Figure12: GDP Growth and Unemployment of China 
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Source: World Development Indicators database, data of 2009 from China National 
Bureau of Statistics 
In order to deal with the negative impacts of global recession and stimulate domestic demand, 
China government released a large stimulating plan valued Rmb4, 000 billion ($586 billion) for 
next 2 years, at the end of 2008. The plan included infrastructure investment, industrial investment, 
expenditure for science and technology, tax reduction, reform of medicine regime, education 
development, and increased complement for peasants and city poor groups. The plan works well 
so far. The industrial production stopped falling, and the Stock market warm up slowly. Because 
China financial sector had not much position on foreign debt derivatives and loans in foreign 
countries, its directly lost for the crisis was little, according to public information. Credit 
contraction didn’t appeared. On the contrary, partly because of stimulus made by government, 
bank loans to non-financial sectors increased largely by 33% in 2009. Worries for recession and 
credit contraction became less. So China government doesn’t have to make similar measures to 
rescue financial institutions and expand credit scale in short term like western countries. But the 
great earthquake in 2008 and other natural disasters happened in these two years observably 
increased public expenditure on relief and rebuilding. These expenditure and stimulus against 
recession increased fiscal pressure together. China made a fiscal deficit in budget by -2.83 percent 
to GDP, equal to Rmb 950 billion (140 billion dollars), which is the largest one since 1986 (Figure 
12). At the same time, Public debt increased 23.8% to 1434 billion dollars in 2008, equal to 33.1 
percent to GDP (Fingure 13). It became a new record since 1993.The number was similar in 
September, 2009, and percentage to GDP even declined because of rapid GDP growth. But it will 
increase again in 2010, according to the large deficit. 
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Figure 12: Net lending in budget (China) 
Percent of GDP 
 
Source: World Development Indicators database, National Bureau of Statistics. 
Figure 13: Public debt of China in budget 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, BIS, and Author’s calculation. Data of 2009 is for 
September. Public debt equal to outstanding of international and domestic debt securities adds 
claims of foreign banks in non-local currencies.  
Sovereign risk management 
    China still has not a clear sovereign risk management framework. But partly because of 
Chinese prudential culture, the rule of keeping budget balance has been implemented in practice 
before 2000. Although deficit appeared in most years after 1991, the level was controlled less than 
3 percent of GDP (if the net lending out of budget was calculated, the level would be lower). This 
is fundamental and necessary for sovereign risk management.  
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But the fiscal situation changed a lot after 2000. Expenditure on Pension reform, 
infrastructure investment, and allowance of developing areas increased largely. Scale of public 
debt expended rapidly on absolute level and relative level, although it still far from warning line. 
The trend is sustained and should be noticed. After global financial crisis and nature disasters 
happened, the government make some measures to reduce government own expense. The result is 
still unobservable. China social wealth expenditure will increase continuously in future. It will 
intensify fiscal pressure. Continuous economic growth supplied “growth dividend”. These 
dividends expanded the space of fiscal budget and public deficit. But growth dividend may be 
uncertain and not enough. A regime framework for fiscal constraints is necessary.  
China government financed mainly from domestic debt market. Its external debt only was 17 
billion dollars in its total 1400 billion dollars debt at the end of September, 2009 (Figure 13). That 
means the government don’t have to worry about volatilities of exchange rate and international 
debt markets like other developing countries. A domestic development debt market can help to 
facilitate economic growth (Ali and Jakob, 2007) and financial stability (CGFS, 2007). Of course, 
it will supply finance facility for its central government. China government has benefitted from its 
debt market, although the market still far from well developped. The main investors of 
government debt are commercial banks and special clearing members
4
. Other financial and 
non-financial institutions and personal investors only hold small share (Fingure 14). It is potential 
threat for stability of financing sources. If some banking crisis happens, the government will feel 
difficult to refinance for its mature debt. According to Reinhart et al(2003) and (Frank, 2002), 
government debt default is relative with inflation and political stability. China remains vigilant on 
these two issues. Weak transparency seems not influence domestic investors’ confidence on public 
debt. But complexity of debt structure and external pressure have made central government 
recognized its importance. Improving transparency will help the government to built long=term 
fiscal sustainability. Even the transparency will be able only on a small scale. 
To keep financial stability and control contingent liabilities, the government began to reform 
state-owned banks since 1998 through capital injection, non-performance loans stripping, issuing 
                                                             
4
 Special clearing members usually include central bank and some state background institutions in China. 
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new shares and going to list. These early interventions improve banks’ capital adequacy ratio and 
competitiveness, although they raised moral risk problem. Fiscal risk exposed in financial sector 
was under control before recession came. Some temporary measures were introduced in this 
recession, such as tax reduction on cars and houses purchase. These temporary measures were 
planned to implement for 1 or 2 years. They stimulated domestic consumption without decreasing 
revenue in medium-term. 
Figure 14: Structure of China public debt investors (December, 2009) 
 
     
Source: China Government Securities Depository Trust &Clearing Co. 
Ⅵ.Conclusion 
    Sovereign risk became a common issue after 2007 financial crisis happened. But the crisis 
was only an incentive. Some high sovereign risk countries had lacked reliable sovereign risk 
management framework and lend overmuch debt before the crisis came. High cost of crisis and 
succeeding recession shoot the critical strike. Taking the cases of Sweden and China, I find 
Sweden as a small development open economy and China as a large developing transition 
economy passed through the worst time without sovereign risk worry. I don’t want to emphasize 
both of these two countries have managed their sovereign risk perfectly. But both of them have 
similar characters of fiscal conditions. Their deficits were controlled well before the crisis. They 
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both have low debt levels in respective similar countries. And they both experienced long bloom 
time before the crisis. These characters means that fiscal expenditure constraints, debt control, and 
surplus accumulation in common time are most important measures to manage sovereign risk. It’s 
difficult to set unified standard for all countries, but a stable and efficient sovereign risk 
management regime framework should be found. It could ensure that identification, forecast, 
management and supervision of sovereign risk are implemented efficiently. A medium-term fiscal 
stability target should be included. The target should think about impacts of business cycle and 
possible external shocks. It’s better for some institution independent from government, such as 
parliament, to build and maintain the framework. Managing sovereign risk of itself should be a 
necessary part of a government’s daily fiscal work. Early intention, temporary stimulus policy and 
other budget measures could decrease cost of crisis and recession. When the crisis management 
machine begins to work, the sovereign risk management framework can’t be paused. If the 
framework has thought enough about fiscal cost of suddenly shocks, it could help address the 
crisis, instead of aggravating it. A development domestic debt market could help relief refinancing 
pressure of government when some external shock happened. Perfect framework of statistics, 
specific accounting standard, high transparency will help the public and investors make decisions 
better. It will make easier for government, creditors, and investors to reach some debt restructure 
agreement. 
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